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In this review we consider research on social cognition in which implicit processes can be compared and
contrasted with explicit, conscious processes. In each case, their function is distinct, sometimes comple-
mentary and sometimes oppositional. We argue that implicit processes in social interaction are automatic
and are often opposed to conscious strategies.While we are aware of explicit processes in social interaction,
we cannot always use them to override implicit processes. Many studies show that implicit processes facil-
itate the sharing of knowledge, feelings, and actions, and hence, perhaps surprisingly, serve altruism rather
than selfishness. On the other hand, higher-level conscious processes are as likely to be selfish as prosocial.A Brief History of Social Cognitive Neuroscience
Less than 20 years ago, the idea of identifying human brain sys-
tems involved in social interaction would have met with incredu-
lity and derision. Such social matters were the domain of the hu-
manities rather than biology (Frith, 2007). Yet humans are among
the most social of all primates and success in social interactions
is one of themajor forces driving our evolution (Humphrey, 1976).
Now there are two specialist journals and innumerable laborato-
ries dedicated to social cognitive neuroscience. Such research
programs aim to uncover the physiology underlying the cognitive
processes engaged during social interactions. How did the ex-
traordinary flourishing of this topic come about?
Studies of complex social behavior in monkeys (e.g., Cheney
and Seyfarth, 1990) have provided one major impetus for the de-
velopment of social neuroscience. One of the first people to talk
explicitly about the social brain was Leslie Brothers (1990), and
her evidence for identifying the components came from the
study of nonhuman animals. One influential and still unanswered
question, originally posed by Premack andWoodruff (1978), was
whether the chimpanzee had a ‘‘Theory of Mind.’’ This question
and possible methods for answering it galvanized research in
child development (e.g., Leslie, 1987; Wimmer and Perner,
1983). Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) showed that children with au-
tism were unable to attribute false beliefs and predict someone
else’s behavior on the basis of their mental states at the appro-
priate age. From this observation of a circumscribed deficit in so-
cial cognition, it was a small step to use the recently available
techniques of neuroimaging to investigate what brain processes
might underlie the normally pervasive attribution of mental states
(e.g., Fletcher et al., 1995).
Animal research in another field has also powered ideas on the
brain basis of social cognition. This is the groundbreakingdiscov-
ery of mirror neurons by Rizzolatti and his colleagues, which was
rapidly taken up in human experiments (Rizzolatti and Craighero,
2004). The physiological basis of such fundamental social pro-
cesses as imitation, emotional resonance, and empathy could
now be studied with precision, and it brought rigor to a field
that was threatened by a poverty of good experimental data.Another crucial field that has contributed ideas to the brain
basis of social interaction is experimental economics. Here
also there has been a critical role for animal studies. Economic
models of decision making can be applied directly to the study
of animal learning and can guide the analysis of human brain im-
aging studies (Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004). Economic models
allow concepts such as trust and altruism to be quantified and
make links between evolutionary psychology andmoral behavior
(Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981).
Social neuroscience also owes a debt to social psychology.
Social psychologists during the 20th century made many re-
markable discoveries, showing for instance that an individual’s
behavior could be shaped and changed, even criminalized, by
systematic manipulation of social interactions, as in the famous
experiments by Asch, Milgram, and Zimbardo. However, it was
not until the technological breakthrough of brain imaging meth-
odologies that social psychology could transform itself into so-
cial cognitive neuroscience. At the first conference on this topic,
Ochsner and Lieberman (2001) celebrated the emergence of this
new field. They wished ‘‘to infuse social psychology with brain
science methodology in the hope of deciphering how the brain
controls such cognitive processes as memory and attention,
which then influence social behaviors such as stereotyping,
emotions, attitudes, and self-control.’’
An Introduction to Themes in Social Cognitive
Neuroscience
Today, research in social neuroscience includes many themes.
These can be classified into three principal domains. First, par-
ticipants are asked to read the dispositions and emotions of
other people, often via facial expressions. Second, participants
are asked to read the intentions, desires, knowledge, and beliefs
of other people (called theory of mind or mentalizing). Third, pairs
of participants engage in real-time interactions, typically by play-
ing economic games. The first two classes are largely concerned
with the effect of social situations on individuals. Only studies in
the third domain directly investigate themutual give and take be-
tween two or more individuals involved in social interactions.Neuron 60, November 6, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 503
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study play an important role in these social interactions. In this
essay we will concentrate on the distinction between implicit
and explicit processes.
Implicit and Explicit Processes in Social Cognition
One idea that has emerged in all these domains is that there are
two levels of social cognition. At the lower level there are fast,
relatively inflexible routines that are largely automatic and im-
plicit and may occur without awareness. At the higher level
there are slow, flexible routines that are explicit and require the
expenditure of mental effort. We shall illustrate this point with
two examples.
Prejudice
People respond automatically to the presentation of a fearful
facewith a fear response. They show increased autonomic activ-
ity and increased neural activity in the amygdala (Ohman and
Mineka, 2001). This happens even when the fearful face is
masked in such a way that the subject is unaware that it was pre-
sented (Morris et al., 1999; Whalen et al., 1998). Implicit race
prejudice is revealed when people respond to the presentation
of a black face with a similar fear response. The amplitude of
this response in the amygdala correlates with the degree of prej-
udice as measured by the Implicit Association Test, but not with
explicit (conscious) measures of race prejudice (Phelps et al.,
2000). In a subsequent experiment (Cunningham et al., 2004),
the faces of black Americans were presented, either very briefly
(30 ms) or for a longer period (535 ms). The amygdala activation
associated with implicit (unconscious) race prejudice was much
reduced when the faces were presented for the longer period.
Furthermore, the magnitude of activity in prefrontal cortex pre-
dicted how much the amygdala activity would be reduced for
the long presentations. This result suggests that activation in
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) is associated with deliberate attempts to control
undesirable prejudicial responses to black faces. There are
two forms of race prejudice: implicit and explicit. Within individ-
uals these implicit and explicit forms are relatively independent
of each of other.
Mentalizing
Mentalizing refers to the ability to read the desires, intentions,
and beliefs of other people and is also referred to as having a the-
ory of mind. The acid test of this ability is the false belief task
(Wimmer and Perner, 1983). For example, we know that Maxi
will look for his chocolate in the cupboard because he doesn’t
know that his mother has moved it to the fridge. His behavior
is determined by his false belief about the location of the choco-
late. Children can pass this test at around the age of 5 years. At
this age they have explicit knowledge about Maxi’s false belief.
They can tell you why Maxi looks in the wrong place. However,
an implicit understanding of false beliefs can be found in younger
children. At around the age of 3 years many children will look at
the correct location (where Maxi believes the chocolate to be),
while telling the experimenter that Maxi will look in the other
location (Clements and Perner, 1994). Furthermore, infants of
between 12 and 15months old are surprised (as defined by a lon-
ger time spent looking) when an actor’s behavior is not deter-
mined by that actor’s false belief (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005;504 Neuron 60, November 6, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.Surian et al., 2007). Here again there are two forms of mentaliz-
ing, implicit and explicit, that may be relatively independent. For
example, it has been proposed (Frith, 2004) that people at the
high-functioning end of the autistic spectrum lack implicit men-
talizing, but have acquired an explicit form through teaching
and experience.
The Role of Instructions
As yet we know very little about the relationship between these
implicit and explicit processes in social cognition. Do explicit
processes build upon the preexisting implicit processes? Can
explicit knowledge directly affect implicit processes? Our guess
is that they are largely independent. Some evidence for this inde-
pendence comes from studies of the very basic physiological
process of fear conditioning. If beings experience a visual stim-
ulus, such as blue square, repeatedly followed by a shock, peo-
ple (and other animals) will rapidly show a fear response to the
blue square. Such learning can also occur in a social context.
Observing someone else receiving the shock after the blue
square will condition the observer to give a fear response to
the blue square. In both these cases the learning could be driven
by implicit processes: the implicit process by which shock elicits
fear and the implicit process by which the sight of a fearful face
elicits fear. Fear conditioning can also be achieved by explicit
instructions, i.e., telling the subject that the blue square will be
followed by a shock. However, this explicit route does not affect
the implicit system. If the conditioned stimulus (the blue square)
is presented subliminally a fear response still occurs after direct
experience of a shock and after observation. It does not occur
after explicit instructions (Olsson and Phelps, 2004).
The Interfering Effects of Implicit Social Processes
In addition to our lack of awareness of it, something that is al-
ways difficult to prove, another sign of an automatic, implicit
process is that we have no top-down control over it. The process
runs whether we want it to or not. Many processes involved in
social cognition are automatic in this sense. Here are three
examples from different domains.
Gaze Following
People (andmany other animals) follow the gaze of others (Goos-
sens et al., 2008). Theywill lookat the sameplacewhere someone
else is looking. As a result gaze direction can be used as a cue in
covert attention tasks. If a face looks to the left just before a target
appears on the left, the response to that target will be quicker. If
the face had looked to the right, the response to the target would
havebeenslower (Driver et al., 1999). This is thecuevalidity effect.
This effect occurs even when the gaze direction cue is presented
subliminally (Sato et al., 2007).Bayliss andTipper haveshown that
this is an automatic response that occurs even when this inter-
feres with performance. In these experiments the gaze cue was
givenby individual faces.Some faces looked in thesamedirection
as the target, while others consistently looked in the opposite
direction. However, this difference did not affect gaze following.
Subjects continued to follow the gaze of the faces that looked in
the wrong direction even though this slowed down their response
to the target (Bayliss and Tipper, 2006).
Imitating Actions
When we observe other people in motion, activity can be seen
in brain regions concerned with the production of action.
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fied in the premotor and parietal cortices of the monkey (Rizzo-
latti and Craighero, 2004). This overt imitation of others can spill
over into overt imitations of which we seem to be unaware. For
example, when people converse they tend to imitate each
others’ movements and gestures (the chameleon effect: Char-
trand and Bargh, 1999). This automatic imitation can interfere
with the actions of the observer. If we watch someone moving
their arm from side to side while we are moving our arm up
and down, our movements become more variable (Kilner et al.,
2003). However, this interference only happens if we believe
we are watching the movements of another human rather than
a robot (Stanley et al., 2007).
Tracking the Knowledge of Others
In order to solve the theory of mind tasks we discussed earlier,
we have to appreciate that people do not know about things
that they cannot see (e.g., the food hidden behind the rock)
and also that what they can see will depend on their point of
view. So, for example, I know that my living room has four pic-
tures in it: two on the east wall and two on the west wall. How-
ever, someone entering the room for the first time will only see
the two on the west wall and will not know that there are two
on the wall behind her. So I know that there are four pictures in
the room, and I also know that my friend can only see two of
them. Translating this scenario into an experimental setting,
Samson et al. (2007) have shown that the mere presence of an
ignorant person in the room interferes with subjects’ ability to
say how many pictures are in the room. They are slower and
may make errors. It seems that we cannot help taking into ac-
count other peoples’ knowledge.
Tracking the Goals and Intentions of Others
We have already discussed the covert attention paradigm in
which invalid cues can slow down responses to targets. A related
choice reaction time paradigm makes use of congruent and in-
congruent imperative signals. In an experiment by Sebanz and
colleagues, the imperative stimulus was a pointing finger with
a ring on it. If the ring was red the left button was to be pressed,
while if the ring was green the right button was to be pressed.
The direction inwhich the finger pointed (left or right) was to be ig-
nored. In this case, a red ringwith the finger pointing right is an ex-
ampleof an incongruoussignal andelicits a slower response.This
interfering effect of incongruity can be eliminated if the paradigm
is turned into a go no-go task in which the subject only has to re-
spond to the red ring. With this paradigm there is no interference
when thefingerpoints in the ‘‘wrong’’ direction. Thecritical obser-
vation is what happens when a second subject is brought in to
perform theother half of the task.Onesubjectpresses the left but-
ton for the red ring. The other presses the right button for the
green ring. With this paradigm the interference comes back, but
only if the second subject is actually performing the task. Their
mere presence is not enough (Sebanz et al., 2003). This result
shows that we automatically represent the task our companion
is doing even though this interferes with our own performance.
What Is the Function of These Low-Level
Automatic Processes?
We have emphasized the interfering effects of these processes
as evidence that they are automatic. The corollary of this demon-stration is that, in most circumstances, they are beneficial. The
benefit that they provide is to increase the efficiency and suc-
cess of group behavior at the expense of the individual.
The Automatic Following of Gaze Shifts: Joint Attention
By following the gaze of others we discover what it is that they
are attending to. In this way we achieve joint attention; that is,
we both attend to the same thing and the foreground and back-
ground aspects of our attention become aligned (Tomasello and
Carpenter, 2007). The effects of observing eye gaze are not
simply about altering the direction of spatial attention. Joint
attention allows us to learn about the world from others. Infants
learn to approach or avoid novel objects by observing the re-
sponse of the mother during joint attention (social referencing,
Feinman et al., 1992). This effect also happens in adults. Objects
looked at by other people are more liked than objects that do not
receive attention (Bayliss et al., 2006). Observation of eye gaze
shifts elicits activity in the posterior superior temporal sulcus
(pSTS) (Pelphrey et al., 2003). This activity seems to reflect infer-
ences about the intention of the actor since it is greater when the
gaze shift is in an unexpected direction (see also Saxe et al.,
2004). Furthermore, this activity is specific to social cues that
direct attention including both pointing and eye gaze (Materna
et al., 2008b). In contrast, nonsocial cues that orient attention
elicit activity in intraparietal sulcus (IPS) (Materna et al., 2008a).
Sharing Action
When performing a task with someone else, we need to coordi-
nate our movements and ensure that we have the same goal.
This alignment in action is helped by covert and automatic rep-
resentations of the actions and intentions of others. Indeed,
the covert imitation manifest in the chameleon effect biases peo-
ple toward prosocial behavior. If our movements are covertly
imitated we will feel more friendly toward the person who is
imitating us and will even feel more well-disposed toward people
in general, as shown by an increased willingness to give money
to charity (van Baaren et al., 2004). This effect seems only to
work whenwe are unaware of the imitation (Lakin and Chartrand,
2003). If we become aware of the imitation it seems creepy and
manipulative rather than pleasing.
However, simply imitating the actions of another is often not an
aid to joint action. For example, when carrying a heavy object to-
gether, one person may walk forward while the other person
walks backward (Sebanz et al., 2006). The alignment of goals
is usually more important than the alignment of actions and ac-
tions may have to be complementary rather than imitative. In
the study by Reed et al. (2006), two subjects had to move a lever
to control the position of a pointer on a screen. The two levers
were joined by a rigid rod so that the movements of the two sub-
jects had to be precisely coordinated. Their only means of com-
munication was the force they could sense in the rod. The strik-
ing result of this study was that the time taken to move the
pointer to a target was shorter when the two subjects acted to-
gether rather than when either acted alone. This was achieved
by the rapid acquisition of complementary strategies whereby
one subject controlled the acceleration and the other the decel-
eration phase of the rapid ballistic movement.
Shared action can be observed in infants as young as 18
months (Warneken and Tomasello, 2006). Such infants will spon-
taneously help strange adults to achieve their goals. This helpingNeuron 60, November 6, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 505
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indicating an understanding of these goals and the motivation
to help.
The observation of movements in humans typically elicits ac-
tivity in premotor and inferior parietal cortices, which probably
contain neurons equivalent to the mirror neurons found in mon-
keys (Dinstein et al., 2007; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). How-
ever, mirror neurons are characterized as being linked to the
execution of a specific action and the observation of that same
action. This leads to the question of what happens in the mirror
system when complementary rather than identical actions are
required in a joint action task. Newman-Norlund et al. (2007) de-
vised a task in which subjects interacted while making either the
same action or complementary actions. Activity in inferior frontal
and inferior parietal cortices was greater during preparation for
complementary action. This suggests that these regions support
a more sophisticated system in which the link between action
execution and action observation is modulated by the needs of
the joint action task that is being performed.
Sharing Knowledge
The automatic alignments between people that we have been
discussing provide the common ground (Clark, 1996) that is
important for successful interactions, including verbal interac-
tions. During a dialog speakers become aligned at many levels
from the phonological to syntax and semantics (Pickering and
Garrod, 2004). This alignment improves comprehension. We
suggest that there is an additional alignment relating to knowl-
edge. To achieve successful group action, we need to know
what other people know and, in particular, what other people
don’t know. We also need to know about common knowledge,
which is the knowledge that everybody knows that everybody
knows (Geanakoplos, 1994). One of the Gricean maxims for
good communication is that you should not tell people things
that they already know (Grice, 1989). We suggest that, in addi-
tion, there is an automatic drive to tell people things that they
don’t know. At 3 years infants will adjust their answers to take
into account the ignorance of their questioner (Perner and Lee-
kam, 1986). As early as 12 months, infants will point to inform
others about events these others do not know about (Liszkowski
et al., 2007).
To achieve common knowledge we should go further and tell
people what they don’t know in public so that everybody else
now knows that they know. This is one of the many important
features of gossip.
Underpinning this drive to tell people things they don’t know is
the automatic tendency to represent what other people know
when it is different from what we know. As we have seen this
can interfere when we are asked to say what we know in the
presence of someone with different knowledge (Samson et al.,
2007). Perhaps it is this tendency and the related drive to share
knowledge that explains the difficulty that even adults have
with hiding their privileged knowledge (Keysar et al., 2003).
The Group versus the Individual
According to Sober andWilson (1998) when individuals compete
within a group it is the uncooperative (selfish) individuals who do
better. However, when groups compete it is the groups with
more cooperative individuals that do better. So how do groups506 Neuron 60, November 6, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.maintain a high proportion of unselfish individuals? The auto-
matic processes we have considered may provide the impetus
for people to behave in a cooperative and prosocial manner.
However, as we have seen, these processes are largely auto-
matic and probably occur without awareness. This observation
goes against the idea that man’s primitive instincts are selfish
and that higher rational thought is needed to overcome this
selfishness.
Bentham (1789), for example, was following a long tradition
when he said that ‘‘nature has placed mankind under the guid-
ance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.’’ To be driven
solely by pleasure and pain would seem to be fundamentally self-
ish. However, as Adam Smith (1759) pointed out, man’s greatest
pleasure comes from the approbation of others and his greatest
pain from the disapproval of others. The formation and preserva-
tion of our reputation is a fundamental drive. As a result the mere
presence of others makes us become more prosocial.
Audience Effects
Models of cooperation have recently incorporated the possibility
of ‘‘image scoring’’ and reputation formation as promoters of co-
operation (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a, 1998b; Wedekind and
Milinski, 2000). An example of this effect can be seen when peo-
ple play the dictator game. In this game a proposer is given a sum
of money, a proportion of which he can offer to a second player.
A purely selfish person would offer very small amounts of money
since the second player has no come-back. However, the offers
made in the dictator game are still substantial, at around 20% of
the total (Forsythe et al., 1994). Why should the proposer give
anything away in this game? That generosity in the dictator
game depends, in part, on the wish for a good reputation in the
eyes of others is supported by the observation that smaller offers
are made when the proposer has complete anonymity (Hoffman
et al., 1996). Larger offers aremadewhen proposers believe they
have an audience. Such audience effects can be observed in
children at least as young as 4, for whom the feeling of pride de-
pends strongly upon an audience (Seidner et al., 1988).
The use of generous ‘‘gifts’’ to enhance reputation has a long
history and can be found in all cultures (Mauss, 1924). Such use
extends from traditional potlatch rituals where leaders
strengthen group relations and acquire honor by giving away
large amounts of goods to modern phenomena such as open
source software andWikipedia, to which many people freely do-
nate their time and expertise (Zeitlyn, 2003).
In order to keep an explicit track of our reputation, we need to
be able to represent what other people think about us. This is
sophisticated form of mentalizing. We are doing more than
representing other peoples’ mental states, we are representing
their representation of our mental states. We have speculated
(Amodio and Frith, 2006; see also Saxe, 2006) that anterior ros-
tral medial prefrontal cortex (arMPFC) might have a special role
in such representations. The need to mentalize, whether to pre-
dict what our gaming partner is going to do next or to manipulate
our reputation in his eyes, does not arise if we are playing against
a computer (Rilling et al., 2004) or a person who is simply follow-
ing a predetermined sequence of instructions (Singer et al.,
2004). When subjects believe they are playing against such part-
ners, significantly less activity is observed in brain regions con-
cerned with mentalizing, including MPFC.
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et al. (1986) studied imitation when subjects observed the victim
of an apparently painful injury. When we see someone in pain we
tend to mimic their pain by displaying a facial expression of pain.
This mimicry was significantly enhanced when the observer and
victimwere in eye contact. It seems that, whenwe believe we are
engaged in a social interaction, we experience, or at least ex-
press, more empathy. Is part of this effect also related to reputa-
tion management? Are we trying to make sure that others know
that we have empathy? The implication is that being empathic is
a socially desirable trait.
At least some of these audience effects do not depend upon
explicit processes. Bateson et al. (2006) studied the behavior
of people using an honesty box to pay for hot drinks. Over a se-
ries of weeks either a photograph of a pair of eyes or a photo-
graph of flowers were put on display in the coffee room. There
was a significant increase in the amount of money put in the hon-
esty box on weeks in which eyes rather than flowers were dis-
played. Since the eyes in this experiment were clearly not real
and no actual audience was involved, the effect must reflect an
implicit process that was resistant to the subjects’ explicit knowl-
edge of the situation.
Selfish Emotion and Social Reason?
A traditional Cartesian view has been that automatic processes,
such as emotion, are primitive and selfish, meaning that proso-
cial, altruistic behavior requires these processes to be overrid-
den by reason in the form of explicit high-level control pro-
cesses. There is increasing evidence that this view is wrong
(Damasio, 1994). A good example comes from studies of the ul-
timatum game. In the ultimatum game, as in the dictator game
that we have already discussed, one player (the proposer) is
given a sum of money and then must choose how much to offer
the other player (the responder). In contrast to the dictator game,
the responder may accept the offer or refuse it. A refusal means
that both parties get nothing. A rational responder should accept
any offer however small, since some money is better than none.
However, this is not what actually happens. In the ultimatum
game the majority of responders will refuse offers of less than
a third of the total (see Camerer and Thaler, 1995 for a review).
Responders consider that small offers are ‘‘unfair,’’ and this
emotional response is reflected in the brain activity elicited
with low offers that is observed in the anterior insula (Sanfey
et al., 2003). Furthermore, the greater the activity in the anterior
insula, the more likely the offer is to be rejected. The justification
for interpreting this in terms of emotion is that activity in the an-
terior insula has often been associated with subjective feeling
states, such as the subjective unpleasantness of painful stimu-
lation (Craig, 2002) or the feeling of disgust (Wicker et al.,
2003): it reflects how pleasant or unpleasant we feel a situation
to be.
Altruistic Punishment
The implicit assumption is that this emotional response makes
the decision less rational. However, it is also less selfish. When
we consider the group rather than the individual, turning down
unfair offers can be seen as a good decision. When the re-
sponder turns down an unfair offer in the ultimatum game, he
is effectively punishing the proposer who will not get any moneyas a result of the refusal. This is an example of altruistic punish-
ment since the responder foregoes monetary gain in order to
punish the proposer. We suggest that altruistic punishment is
another example of prosocial behavior.
Altruistic punishment has been shown to have a vital role in
maintaining cooperation in groups (Bowles and Gintis, 2002,
2004; Boyd et al., 2003; Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Gintis, 2000).
In common good games involving several players, the group
benefits from the investments of individual players. Each time
an individual invests, the group as a whole gains, while the indi-
vidual investor loses a little. As long as everyone invests, then ev-
eryone also gains. But in such situations free riders will appear.
These players accept the benefit from the investments of others
while withholding their own money. The free riding individuals
gain at the expense of the group. Once free riders have appeared
in the group cooperation breaks down. If, however, altruistic
punishment is possible, then free riding is reduced and cooper-
ation flourishes (Fehr and Gachter, 2002). Here altruistic punish-
ment is applied even though it brings a material loss to the indi-
vidual player. But while the individual may lose each time he
applies punishment, he benefits in the long run from the
increased cooperation occurring in the group. A loss to the indi-
vidual is converted into a gain for the group.
As with the other examples of prosocial behavior that we have
already discussed, our propensity to apply altruistic punishment
in the ultimatum game depends upon whether or not we are in-
teracting with another person. When the offer in the ultimatum
game is based on the spin of a roulette wheel, much lower offers
are accepted (Blount, 1995). The same result was observed by
Rilling et al. (2004) when subjects believed the offer was being
made by a computer.
Are Higher-Level Control Processes Prosocial?
This result emphasizes the fact that not all automatic, ‘‘primitive’’
processes are selfish. Some are prosocial. So are explicit, high-
level control processes needed to bias our behavior toward
these automatic prosocial processes and away from the selfish
ones? This is clearly not the case. As we have seen the presence
of others is sufficient to bias us automatically toward prosocial
processes. But, of course, this doesn’t mean that explicit high-
level control processes have no role.
In fact the evidence is that high-level control processes are just
as likely to be selfish as prosocial and can be used to override
automatic prosocial behavior. This is illustrated in an experiment
by Valdesolo and DeSteno (2008). This experiment examined the
processes underlying the moral hypocrisy through which sub-
jects judge their own unfair behavior to be less objectionable
than the same behavior in others. The key finding was that this
biased judgment was eliminated when subjects had to perform
a competing cognitive task. These findings suggest that the hy-
pocrisy stems from explicit volitionally guided judgments used to
override automatic, more prosocial attitudes to fairness. Indeed,
it is through becoming explicitly aware of these low-level proso-
cial processes that we can subvert them. Thus, rather than share
knowledge we may keep it to ourselves to manipulate and de-
ceive others. Furthermore, we use our high-level cognition to
provide explicit and ‘‘rational’’ justifications as to why in our
case ‘‘greed is good.’’Neuron 60, November 6, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 507
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Sober and Wilson (1998) suggest that altruistic behavior
emerges from group competition, since groups with a larger pro-
portion of prosocial individuals will do better. One implication of
this idea is that the same process that causes us to help mem-
bers of our own group may cause us to obstruct members of
other groups. Does this mean that prosocial behavior such as
the sharing of feelings, actions, and knowledge with others
does not occur with members of other groups? A suggestion
that this might be the case comes from the study of antisocial
punishment. We already mentioned the finding that the altruistic
punishment of free riders (i.e., low contributors to the common
good) can increase their contributions (Fehr and Gachter,
2002). However, it is observed that, rather than increasing their
contributions, low contributors will sometimes start punishing
the high contributors (Bochet et al., 2006). This is referred to as
perverse or antisocial punishment. A cross-cultural study of al-
truistic and antisocial punishment (Herrmann et al., 2008) found
that altruistic punishment dominated in democratic countries
such as UK, Denmark, and USA. In contrast, antisocial punish-
ment dominated in less democratic countries such as Saudi
Arabia, Russia, and Belarus. Gintis (2008) suggests that this ef-
fect may occur because, in these less democratic and more
traditional societies, many players may feel themselves part of
the small group of family and friends rather than the larger group
of unrelated strangers from the same country. This is an example
of prosocial processes acting against people from a different
group.
At the beginning of this essay we discussed the implicit race
prejudice that often occurs in response to the presentation of
black faces (Phelps et al., 2000). Prejudice is a fundamental pro-
cess by which the brain enables us to decide what to do on the
basis of inadequate evidence. If there is not enough evidence
available in the current stimuli, then we must rely on prior knowl-
edge and expectation. This will always be the case when we
meet someone new, who we have never seen before. Prejudice
is not intrinsically bad, but, inevitably, it will not do justice to this
person. However, when prejudice leads us to believe that this is
not a member of our group, then automatic prosocial processes
may come into play that act against people who are not in our
group. Here our high-level cognitive processes are needed to
suppress undesirable prosocial processes.
Automatic implicit processes, and higher-level strategically
guided social actions, show an intricate interplay that future
studies of social cognition may unravel. If they can do this, we
may find ways to prevent some of the deep conflicts between
selfishness and altruism that mark human history.
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